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PREFACE

The region of Rough Cilicia, known in antiquity as Cilicia
Tracheia, constitutes the western part of the larger area of
Cilicia and is characterized by the ruggedness of its territory,
especially as compared to its ‘smooth’ sister-region to the
immediate east, Cilicia Pedias. The mountainous landscape
had fundamental consequences for the history of the region.
It limited agricultural production that in turn must have had
an impact on the economy and size of population centers
of the region relative to the larger urban centers of its
agriculture-rich neighbors, Smooth Cilicia and Pamphylia,
which bordered Rough Cilicia on the west. The forests
that dominated the mountains of Tracheiotis, however,
compensated to some extent for the restricted farming.
Well known from the Hellenistic period through the Roman
Empire as a source of timber, primarily for shipbuilding,
this natural resource had potential for considerable income.
The rugged terrain also offered protection to the inhabitants
during times of invasion and played a major role in the
acculturation process of the region. In addition, the protection
afforded by the high mountains combined with the rugged
seacoast fostered the prolific piracy that developed in the
late Hellenistic period, bringing much notoriety to Rough
Cilicia, to such an extent that the terms “Rough Cilicia” and
“piracy” go hand in hand.
Until relatively recently, however, Rough Cilicia could
be considered terra incognita to modern scholarship.
The pioneers of Rough Cilicia studies are few: Beaufort,
Heberdey, Wilhelm, Bean, Mitford, Rosenbaum, Huber,
Russell, Karamut, Tomaschitz, Equini Schneider, and Rauh.
The past few decades, however, have seen a shift in scholarly
attention paid to the region. Beginning in the 1960s the
well-preserved remains of Anemurium were systematically
exposed by James Russell. More recently Syedra and
Elaiussa Sebaste have also undergone excavation. In the
mid-1960s the survey led by Elizabeth Rosenbaum-Alföldi
and Gerhard Huber produced the first extensive investigation
of the architectural remains of Rough Cilicia. The resulting
publication (Rosenbaum 1967) has yet to be superseded,

although beginning in 1996 the Rough Cilicia Survey Project
(RCSP), led by Nicholas Rauh, has explored a portion of
the region in a controlled systematic fashion. The recently
published preliminary report (Rauh et al. 2009) offers the
first systematic view of the long-term urban development of
Rough Cilicia, setting the stage for future research.
Such recent work has added considerably to our under
standing of the region. Unavoidably, however, the findings
have been diffuse, the product of individual specialists and
teams of researchers from a wide array of countries: Turkey,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United
Kingdom, United States, among others. Several colloquia
have helped to overcome this deficiency, and our purpose in
convening the conference, Rough Cilicia: New Historical and
Archaeological Approaches at the University of NebraskaLincoln in 2007, was simple: to add to this process of
synthesis by drawing upon the expertise of those scholars who
have conducted important research in Rough Cilicia in order
to assess the state of knowledge regarding the region.
The papers in the volume are presented in approximate
chronological order. Spelling conventions, always vexing
in classical publications, are particularly problematic in a
volume of this sort, which ranges widely from prehistory
through Greek and Roman eras into the medieval period.
Recognizing that no one convention is satisfactory, the editors
have elected to use the Latin rather than the Greek spelling
of all proper names in order to maintain consistency, hence,
e.g., Selinus rather than Selinos and Antiochia ad Cragum
rather than Antiocheia epi Krago.
The editors would like to thank the other organizing
committee members, Hugh Elton, Ismail Karamut, Nicholas
Rauh, and the late Kurt Tomaschitz, for their thoughtful
help and suggestions that ultimately made the conference
a success. We would also like to thank the individual
contributors, for their cooperation in revising their conference
presentations and their patience in seeing this volume to
publication. A special note of appreciation is given to James
Russell, not only for his help in the conference organization
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and subsequent editing of the papers, but also because of his
pioneering work in the archaeology of Rough Cilicia.
The conference would not have been possible without the
financial assistance of a number of sponsors. The University
of Nebraska–Lincoln has earned our deep gratitude for its
generous support of the conference. In particular we would
like to thank the following: UNL Research Council; MEDICI;
Edward Forde, Chair, Department of Art and Art History;
and Giacomo Oliva, Dean, Hixson-Lied College of Fine and
Performing Arts.
We also extend our appreciation to Bailey Barnard, Emma
Clute, and Amanda Washburn who assisted in certain editorial

aspects of these proceedings, to Christy Aggens for her
graphic designs and web mastery, and to Clare Litt at Oxbow
Books for editorial and publication advice. Special thanks
are due to the two anonymous reviewers of the submitted
manuscripts who made the papers better.
Finally, we would like to dedicate this volume to Kurt
Tomaschitz, a member of our organizing committee, who
was to present a paper at the conference but whose failing
health at the time would not allow travel to Nebraska, and
whose subsequent tragic death has left a great void in Rough
Cilicia studies. Thank you, Kurt.
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14.
Public Buildings and Civic Benefactions in Western Rough
Cilicia: insights from signaling theory
LuAnn Wandsnider

1. Introduction
In the Hellenistic and Roman world of the eastern
Mediterranean, Greek and Greco-Roman cities came to be
defined by their physical cityscape, with public buildings that
were the seat of various civic transactions among citizens
and other residents. These buildings were constructed by
specific city institutions, such as the council and the assembly,
and financed through city funds, mass subscription and,
importantly, public benefactions. Public benefactions, which
also included support for festivals and competitions, were
made by certain elite and usually wealthy individuals to the
benefit of a defined community of citizens (and sometimes
non-citizens, as in the case of fortification walls). Institutions
within the benefiting community, again the council and the
assembly, acknowledged these gifts with a published decree
and inscriptions or statues situated in places of honor.
Various scholars have commented on the appearance,
form, and nature of the Greco-Roman cityscape in Anatolia.
Here, I explore the utility of viewing this phenomenon
through the lens of multi-level signaling theory. I suggest
these public buildings constitute a conjoined individualcommunal “signal” that relayed important information to
attentive citizens, nearby cities, and agents of Rome. This
signal synergistically satisfied four ends: the elite effectively
and materially conveyed their hidden talents to a diverse
community, establishing position in a dynamic hierarchy and

winning various rewards for themselves and family; non-elite
citizens learned of and could make decisions about which
of various contenders for positions of authority to support;
city institutions materially signaled their communal values,
maintaining the support of the citizens in spite of increasing
wealth differentials; and finally the city communicated to
external audiences (other local cities, Rome’s client kings,
and later agents of imperial Rome) its ability to mount
significant collective actions, thereby remaining viable
if not outcompeting other cities for access to contested
resources.
I focus especially on western Rough Cilicia where both
honorific inscriptions acknowledging civic benefactions and
public building increase in frequency in the later first century
after Christ and then decline in the later third century after
Christ,1 a pattern seen more generally for provincial Asia
Minor.2 Western Rough Cilicia departs from other parts
of Asia Minor in the composition of its cityscapes, which
included public buildings like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths
but show little evidence of larger public structures like arenas
and theatres.3 Signaling theory,4 a body of theory based in
evolutionary thinking that focuses on the differential benefits
to individuals and groups who effectively send and receive
signals about their hidden qualities (see below), offers insights
as to why civic benefactions and public building should look
different here compared with western Asia Minor.
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2. Civic buildings and public benefactions in
Hellenistic Anatolia and provincial Asia Minor
The Hellenistic period of the eastern Mediterranean was,
as John Ma notes, the “age of the city-states [or] poleis…
of kings…and of elephants, gigantic warships, imperial
processions, and stupendous feasting and drinking.”5 During
this time Greek city culture expanded both within the greater
Mediterranean basin and also to the east beyond through
colonization and other means. Whereas the hundreds of
colonies established during the heyday of early Greek
colonization (750 – 550 BC) had been confined to coastal
areas around the Mediterranean and Black Sea, during the
Hellenistic period new cities (perhaps as many as 150)
appeared in the wake of Alexander throughout Anatolia,
Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.6 These cities likely
represented previously existing cities that now included a
Greek population, a new Greek name, and, critically, Greek
civic institutions.7 Simultaneously, some non-Greek cities in
Anatolia, such as Alabanda, came to adopt Greek political
language and civic apparatus at this time.8
Roman presence in the area gradually increased during the
late Republic as the usurper Aristonikos and the Mithridatic
rebellion on land and, later, piracy at sea attracted direct
Roman involvement. By the imperial period, population
centers of indigenous peoples along with resident Greeks and
Romans (especially in interior Asia Minor) were deliberately
organized into communities by agents of Rome and a city
government based on a modified Greek model was installed.
Towns and other units were formally designated and made
subordinate to nearby cities.9
Public buildings
The cityscape of Hellenistic Anatolian cities represented an
accommodation to recent city history, topography, and the
relative health of various institutions characteristic of Greek
cities.10 The thriving urban culture of the Hellenistic cities is
seen in the almost uniform presence of civic institutions with
a material or architectural expression: an agora with nearby
prytaneion, bouleuterion, stoas, temples and sanctuaries
(some now dedicated to cults originating from Alexander’s
East), gymnasium or gymnasia, a theatre, a stadium, an
auditorium, a library, a commercial agora with shops, and
city walls along with a secure water supply.11
Early imperial Greco-Roman cities, almost by definition,
featured earlier Hellenistic fortifications (walls, gates, and
towers), religious structures (temples, sanctuaries, and altars),
political meeting places (bouleuteria or basilicas and also
large areas for public assemblies), well-defined cultural or
educational structures associated with high urban culture
(gymnasia, odeia, theatres, libraries), and civic amenities having

177

to do with water supplies (baths, aqueducts, nymphaia).12 An
additional feature of the city at this time were large decorative
monuments, such as arches, statues, monumental inscriptions,
and heroes’ tombs, that reflected and amplified the prestige
of the wealthy and powerful, including the Roman emperor.
Importantly for the discussion that follows, city status was
indexed to the splendor of the cityscape.13
Construction costs were quite high in antiquity with,
for example, a single medium-sized temple in North Africa
in the second century after Christ costing 60,000 – 70,000
sesterces14 or the equivalent of the annual subsistence for
some 500 people.15 Thus construction of a public building
was not a trivial matter. Some public buildings were built
with labor donated by citizens but most seem to have been
financed in one of several ways. In the early Hellenistic
era, the Successors to Alexander, in their attempts to recruit
local support, may have gifted particular structures to cities.
One may cite, for example, contributions to rebuild Rhodes
after a devastating earthquake in 228/227 BC coming from
Ptolemy III, Antigonus Doson, Seleucus III, Mithridates II,
and others.16 Also seen are instances of local kings outfitting
their capital cities through publicly acknowledged gifts, as
Eumenes did for Pergamon.17 In the later Hellenistic and
Imperial periods, local wealthy individuals gifted their
respective cities with structures, perhaps of their own volition,
through peer pressure18 and pressure from subordinates,19 or
through solicitation by the council or assembly.20 Similarly,
a wealthy patron from outside the city may have contributed
funds.21 In addition, the city may have solicited funds from
citizens as public subscriptions to underwrite the cost of
constructing specific buildings, at least in later Hellenistic
times.22 In the case of these funding sources, we see material
acknowledgement of the benefaction by the city council and
assembly in inscriptions or statues placed in a prominent
location.
In addition, however, cities may have funded construction
through internal resources, relying on taxes from trade
and money-changing, rent, and annual payments for office
by city magistrates.23 Recent analysis of city documents
for Bithynia, Lycia, and Ephesus shows that, contrary to
previous interpretations, internal city funds might have been
quite substantial.24 On this basis, Arjan Zuiderhoek argues
that cities had more than adequate funding to build and
maintain their splendid cityscapes without depending on the
munificence of elite citizens.25
Public benefactions
As mentioned above, benefactions by elites were one means
by which public buildings came to be constructed. That is,
they were a product of an institution sometimes referred to as
euergetism.26 In addition to benefactions of public buildings,
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several other kinds of public benefactions are attested to in
inscriptions. Some gifts were singular phenomena (such
as underwriting a treasury deficit) while others were more
enduring (designating funds for regularly occurring festivals
or a public building such as a bath). Some may be readily
experienced by the citizens (funerary banquets, bathing oils)
or by visiting foreign visitors (cult festivals, contests, games).
Still others were appreciated either from within (bath, library,
gymnasium) or from afar (fortification walls).
For Paul Veyne and succeeding commentators, euergetism
comprises several essential elements. It involved a particular
and sizable gift, such as oil for baths, a foundation to support
annual festivals remembering a loved one or god, food in
time of crisis, a public building, and, later in Roman times,
gladiatorial contests. In addition, the gift was made to all
or to particular elements of the citizenry, in some cases
reinforcing status differentials within the citizenry27 and,
increasingly in late Hellenistic times, to non-citizens who
were nevertheless residents of the polis or city. Of course,
the gift of a public building could perhaps be seen by all,
even if they did not directly benefit from or participate in
the transactions occurring therein.
The gift size, nature, and location (in the case of buildings)
were negotiated with “the people” (the city assembly) and
sometimes were deliberately recruited by the council28 or
the assembly.29 The gift was in fact made, as opposed to
merely being promised, which also occurred and against
which laws were enacted.30 And, as importantly, the gift
was acknowledged by the city in city records, in honorary
decrees set up in a public place, perhaps with a statue of the
benefactor, or both. As Zuiderhoek emphasizes in his recent
treatment of public benefactions during the Imperial period,
a euergetes was not a euergetes until his or her benefaction
was acknowledged.31 Thus, the gift and its acknowledgement
represented the end result of a successful (and sometimes
protracted) negotiation between the benefactor and city
institutions (council and assembly).
Veyne, Maud Gleason, and Zuiderhoek emphasize the
activist ethos of Greek culture within which public benefactions
occurred.32 That is, one’s virtues were demonstrated through
one’s deeds. Thus, benevolence, excellence, love of honor,
generosity, love of goodness, zeal, munificence were
deliberately put on display through acts of public benefaction
by the elite and such displays justified their positions of power.
This is the emic aspect of public benefactions.
Scholars have also offered various etic perspectives on
public benefactions, recently reviewed by Zuiderhoek. To
these he adds another, arguing that for the cities of Roman
Asia Minor, public benefactions served as the mechanism
by which the civic oligarchy (that is, wealthy elite selected
to the city council for life by other wealthy elite and then
affirmed through popular vote) and the non-elite citizens

together reaffirmed their status quo relationship. Thus he sees
euergetism as an act of legitimation both on the part of the
benefactor elite citizen and the non-elite citizen recipient that
served several ends.33 The first was to maintain the stability
and internal cohesion of the city when extreme wealth
differentials had developed. The second was to mask the
apparent decline in the power of the democratic assemblies
(by which cities still presented themselves to the world,
as seen in inscriptions). And, lastly, Zuiderhoek sees civic
benefaction as the means to naturalize the ongoing transition
from that of the classical Greek ideology of isonomia, that
is, the political equality of citizens,34 to an ideology more
congruent with the extant hierarchical order.
Zuiderhoek has amassed a database of more than 500
benefactions from inscriptions from throughout Asia Minor,
especially emphasizing the west, where likely more inscriptions
were produced and more have been found through dedicated
epigraphic and archaeological work. His inscriptions come
from cities with some antiquity as well as provinces with
newer Greek cities. Elsewhere I have suggested that his
interpretation of civic benefaction as an act of legitimization
may well describe the situation for the older Greek cities.35 For
the newer cities of Lycia, for example, where tribal lineages
rather than democratic Greek institutions may have played a
more important role in organizing social interactions, other
interpretations, explored below, may be necessary.
Public benefactions are associated with critical interactions
occurring both within the city and also between cities. Within
the city, the rise of public benefactions seems associated with
both increased inter-individual competition and expanding
wealth that allowed for social mobility among citizens in
the Hellenistic period and later among freedman in the early
Imperial period.36 Gleason and Price highlight the competition
for reputation that occurred among elite individuals and
families during the early Imperial period in Asia Minor.37 In
part, the inter-individual competition may have been driven
by simple scalar effects: in two cities – one small, one large,
both with the same civic institutions – the opportunities for
individual access to those institutions will be more limited in
the case of the city with a larger body of citizens. However,
differential wealth seems to have exacerbated this situation,
so that for the later Hellenistic and early imperial times, the
emergence of an oligarchy, with more of the sacral offices
becoming secular and more of the secular civic offices being
assumed by individuals and families for life, is evident.38
For the Imperial period (and perhaps extendable to the
earlier Hellenistic period), Zuiderhoek offers a neo-Ricardian
analysis that highlights increasing population and limited
agricultural land, leading to the relative scarcity and hence
increased value of the latter.39 Thus, holders of agricultural
land became relatively wealthier over this interval. One may
also note the climatic amelioration that occurred during the
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later Hellenistic and early Imperial period, which may have
led to increased agricultural productivity at this time.40
Along with expanding wealth, however, were growing
disparities in the distribution of wealth both in the later
Hellenistic period and Imperial period.41 By the Imperial
period, an estimated five percent of the population –
senators, knights, and councilors – held most of the wealth.42
Coincidentally and, I argue below, exactly what might be
expected, we see an increase in ostentatious displays in habit
and in the kinds of benefactions now made.43
Finally, there is another component to the dynamic of
inter-individual or inter-family competition that is likely
demographic in nature. As has been argued for classical
Athens, demographic processes operated to introduce an
element of uncertainty with consequences for the maintenance
of familial wealth.44 That is, given deliberately limited fertility,
husbands typically 10 years older than wives, manipulated
birth/sex ratios that favored males, and possible early death,
the likelihood that a wealthy elite family remained a wealthy
elite family for more than several generations was low.45
At the inter-city or regional level, various kinds of
interaction have been recognized. Ma sees the Greek cities
of Anatolia as more or less homologous polities that engaged
in inter-state arbitration; requests for and granting of asylia
(inviolability) between cities, effected through individual
negotiations; the dispatching of envoys from cities with
famous shrines and festivals to announce festivals to other
cities, where they were grandly received; and the practice
of foreign arbitrators responding to requests from individual
cities.46 The culture shared by the Greek cities is reflected in
their common architectural, ideological, and textual idioms,47
a textbook example of the kind of interaction Renfrew and
Cherry define for peer polities.48
In addition to more amicable relations, competition is
also seen. Territorial disputes are rife in the Hellenistic
period49 and continue into the Imperial period, even in the
pacified environment created under Augustus.50 In addition,
long-standing rivalries between various cities continued, as
for Ephesus and Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna, Prusa
and Apameia, Tyre and Sidon, Nicaea and Nicomedia.
Emperors bestowed or removed the titles of “First City
of…” and cities competed for these titles. City status might
determine tax relief or might bring other resources from
the emperor.51 Furthermore, city status would determine
how city delegations were seated at games and order in
processions at religious festivals and “[g]overnors would
play rival cities off against each other and in this way, hide
their wrong-doing.”52
Inter-city rivalries had a material component, with cities
attempting to outdo the other with grand building plans. There
was a danger in being too grandiose, however, as a corrector
might be dispatched by Rome to reorganize city finances.53
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During the high Imperial period, competitive civic building
gave way to agonistic inter-city competitions.54
In sum, the practice of acknowledged public benefactions
is a social, political, and economic phenomenon recognized
for the Greek urban world that continues in an evolved form
into the Roman Imperial period where it joined the more
Roman practice of patronage. Over the years, researchers
have sought to explain its existence and frequency using
a variety of perspectives sketched above.55 Below, I argue
for viewing it as a costly signal emitted by individuals
and by groups, by citizens and by cities; framing it in this
fashion buys us the ability to better parse the processes of
urbanization that unfolded very differently in tribal societies
of a borderlands like western Rough Cilicia versus the older
Greek cities of Anatolia.

3. Signaling theory
Signaling theory is a subset of Darwinian thinking that
considers the benefits that accrue to individuals or groups
who rapidly learn about each other’s capabilities through
non-lethal means. The signal, a behavioral or material
display with particular characteristics, serves as the conduit
of communication. With this information about individual or
group attributes, people can make decisions in their best selfinterest. People can decide to avoid the shirker and marry the
over-achiever. Similarly, groups may decide to stay clear of
a formidable group or, if nearby and potentially threatening,
may decide to ally themselves. The point of departure for
signaling theory is that through acts on the part of a signaler,
hidden qualities are accurately displayed; assessments of
those hidden qualities are thus made and then acted upon
by the receiver.
Signaling theory, focusing on quality and other properties
of the signal, has been the subject of much recent scholarship
in anthropology.56 Fraser Neiman first deployed these ideas
in archaeological interpretation and since then others have
followed.57 In their recent review, Bird and Smith find
common ground between costly signaling and ideas explored
by Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous consumption by the
newly rich, Marcel Mauss on gift-giving in non-capitalist
societies as the means to win and keep prestige and political
authority, and Pierre Bourdieu on the notion of social capital
and its relationship to economic and symbolic capital.58
While a costly signaling approach to social analysis may
be dismissed as another simplistic reductionist approach that
assumes human behavior is rational, I use it here as a device
to organize research that examines the tension between the
individual and the group (in this case, the citizen and the
city), which may drive institutional changes, and to consider
the materiality of social transactions.
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Signaling is usefully described in terms of the signals exchanged between more or less homologous entities, senders
and receivers.59 Senders send a signal in the form of material
displays – underwriting a festival, constructing a monument,
wearing 15 kilos of fancy jades – that advertise critical
hidden capabilities such as access to resources, kin groups,
or knowledge or personal characteristics (relative health,
charisma, organizational skills, strength, endurance). Individual
receivers, receiving signals from multiple senders, assess
the quality of the signal and infer the quality of the sender,
especially with regard to the hidden capabilities of interest.
Signals have a variety of properties. They may be of varying
quality, they may be emitted frequently or infrequently, they
may be broadcast far or directed towards nearby audiences.
Signals may have target audiences of varying composition.
Signaling theory is usually discussed in terms of individual
or family signaling and more recently in terms of the social
group of varying sizes and composition.
Costly signaling has been the focus of most anthropological
applications of signaling theory and seeks to make understandable conspicuous displays seen in a range of societies.
The idea here is that “the cost of the display functions to
ensure that only high-quality individuals can afford them at
all. Thus, the signal value of conspicuous consumption is
maintained by its costs; these costs in turn are the price wealthy
individuals pay for prestige.”60 Treatments of social behaviors
from a costly signaling perspective make several empirically
demonstrable and reasonable assumptions. For one, variation
exists: particular desirable attributes such as mediation skills,
charisma, physical stamina and family connections all vary
within a population of individuals. Within a population of
groups, asabiyya, or the ability of a group of individuals to
act as a coherent unit, may also vary.61 Second, it is in the
best self-interest of the sender to try to deceive the receivers,
that is, to try to project themselves as wealthier, or stronger,
or better connected than they actually are. This being the
case, it is therefore also in the best interest of the receivers
to accurately evaluate the signals being sent. These factors
operating together create a situation wherein costly signals in
fact honestly represent the capabilities of the senders. Only
those individuals or groups that actually are wealthy, strong,
or well-endowed with connections will be able to sustain this
costly signal.
Most treatments of costly signaling in anthropology
have focused on signaling occurring within a single level,
that is, at the level of individuals or families, although
some consideration of piggy-backing, that is, conjoined
individual-group signaling, has also been offered.62 A recent
examination for contact era New Guinea by Paul Roscoe
offers a compelling analysis of what he terms social signaling,
which plays out at both the individual and group levels but
also links these levels.63 By social signaling, Roscoe refers

to symbolic or ritualized fighting in which true fighting
capabilities are put on display but little blood is actually shed.
For individuals signaling their capacities within complex
and dynamic social groups, social signaling is critical to
the maintenance of group effectiveness, if not harmony. To
resolve internal conflicts, men engage in public, ritualized
contests of song, dance, or head-thumping; superiority
is established and all live to fight for the group the next
day. Abilities critical to supporting group competitiveness
– stamina, courage, strength, mental agility, and acuity – are
put on display for all to evaluate and individuals and families
accordingly decide whom to support.
At the group level, Roscoe recognizes social signaling
by clans to other clans and by villages to other villages.
He distinguishes three forms: conspicuous distributions
(fabulous feasts), conspicuous performances (“elaborately
choreographed exhibitions of singing, dancing, and music
mounted by spectacularly decorated performers”),64 and
conspicuous constructions (gigantic cult houses built by
clans). In the elaborate dances, the contributions of the
individual are masked by costumes as they are in the
massive cult house constructions. All three media – material,
performance, and architecture – reliably communicate
the number of kin and allies willing to support collective
projects, the abilities of contributing individuals, and the fact
that individuals are willing to bend their interests to largerscale, well-organized efforts. That is, they are an index of
a group’s asabiyya or their potential for effective collective
action. Roscoe also recognizes another kind of signal that
may allow for prevarication. Thus, some groups may be so
effective in manipulating their media that through aesthetics
that they can present an image of power and danger that is
not matched by actual strength.
Already mentioned are different signaling media – song
contests and duels at the individual level, choreographed
dances and structures at the group level. This bespeaks that to
some extent, signaling is conducted in a shared language. If
the sender signals via poetry recitations in archaic Greek and
the audience is expecting blood sports in Latin, the message
may be interpreted improperly. In other words, signaling
occurs between individuals within a community of peers or
between polities within a region of peer polities, which by
definition share a common language in architecture, prestige
trade, and ideological motifs.65
Signal degradation occurs over space and time. A dance
may be an effective signal if the audience is within hailing
distance of the dancers and decidedly less effective if at
greater distances.66 Communication may occur over larger
distances, however, through monumental architecture. A
fortification wall may serve the purpose of defense but may
also serve as a deterrent, signaling to more distant groups
“effective community within.”
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James Boone obliquely considers signal frequency in his
examination of magnanimity, an apparently altruistic act of
conspicuous generosity seen in intra- and inter-community
feasting.67 Boone argues that such acts are the means by
which an individual with high social status affirms that
status, demonstrating that they and their family still retain
social power, and therefore access to resources and allies. In
reviewing ethnographic cases from the American northwest
coast and southwest he finds that such displays are often
offered annually. In addition I would note that individuals,
in that they are biological entities that mature and age, are
dynamic in their abilities and capabilities for action and
the same can be said of groups, composed as they are of
individuals. Thus, the recurring broadcast of signals by
individuals and groups is understandable and expectable to
both maintain and assert claims of high status.
What do senders and receivers gain from all of this
signaling? In a competitive situation, both winners and losers
nevertheless survive and the qualities of each are exposed.
Over the short-term, while the sender incurs a cost, the
successful sender reaps benefits in the form of increased
access to mates or higher quality marriage arrangements,68
preferential access to resources in bad times,69 or access to
other political or social offices. Receivers also gain in that
they come to know with whom to ally themselves.70 In the
case of groups in a competitive environment, successful
groups survive and maintain access to territory. They may also
recruit defecting individuals from elsewhere and we may see
the institutions of successful groups being emulated in less
effective groups,71 as in for example the apparent spread of
Greek civic institutions during the Hellenistic period.
The signaling potential of architecture is important to
arguments that follow and so it is useful to briefly highlight
that potential here. Several researchers have observed that
public architecture seems to be often constructed in stressful
(but not catastrophic) times, such as in the initial phase of a
new social, political, or economic formation.72 Elliot Abrams
interprets this pattern in terms of the deliberate formation of
a group identity; a signaling interpretation might emphasize
that individuals and groups are asserting not only identity so
as to differentiate “us” from “them” but, also as importantly,
signaling their competence and capability to attract continuing
support.
On the costliness of the signal, Bruce Trigger points to
monumental architecture, specifically those structures that
exceed in scale and degree of elaboration that which is
required by their functional role, as communicating where
the seat of power in a society lies.73 The larger or more
elaborate the structure, the greater the display of power. Those
in power may also manipulate space and the positioning of
architecture to restrict and screen or to encompass and awe.74
Importantly, public architecture is particularly potent in
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conveying messages to linguistically and ethnically diverse
groups, such as those commonly making up the populace of
early and later states.75 Regarding the potential of architecture
to send an enduring message, Richard Blanton observed,
commenting on monumental architecture in the Valley of
Oaxaca in Mexico: “As communications media, monumental
architecture is actually relatively efficient. The initial costs
of construction may be great, but once built a massive
building or plaza can be seen by thousands of people over
great lengths of time, broadcasting continuously for even
thousands of years.”76
In terms of social signaling, Paul Roscoe argues for
architecture as one of three effective group signals that
serves as an index of collective action, one that also masks
the contribution of the individual.77 Boone seems to ignore
the physicality and thus durable signaling capacity of
monumental architecture.78 He focuses only on its cost,
suggesting that such structures are similar to the destructive
potlatches known historically for American northwest coast
groups, when during community displays, resources were
deliberately “burned” or removed from circulation; material
goods likely became more valuable but also unavailable to
actually feed or clothe potlatch attendees. I suggest instead
that the importance resides in the materiality or physicality
of this architecture, which our stereoscopic vision is adept
at reading.
In sum, signaling theory and social signaling highlight
that deeds transcend words in communicating the hidden
talents of individuals to diverse groups of individuals and of
groups to other groups. Roscoe’s work is especially important
here, focusing as it does on the effectiveness of individual
signaling within groups and also group signaling to other
groups within regions.79 In effect, he is arguing for a form
of multi-level signaling, a kind of thinking in evolutionary
circles that brings “the group” back into equations that until
recently only reckoned the selective benefits of behaviors
on individuals and their kin. Group effectiveness and thus
selection for solidarist behaviors on the part of individuals
seems especially critical in environments that are rife with
inter-group competition,80 or are otherwise inchoate.81

4. Civic buildings and public benefactions as
individual and communal signals in Hellenistic
Anatolia and imperial Asia Minor
In the emic sense, the public benefactions documented for
Hellenistic Anatolia and early imperial Asia Minor were,
as represented in texts, gifts of elite benefactors to the
citizenry. From an etic perspective, however, they may be
considered signals being emitted by individuals within a
dynamic community composed of other individuals and also
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deliberately recruited and emitted by communities sharing
Greek urban culture within a dynamic social landscape.
The acknowledgement of the benefactions, testified to in
inscriptions and statues, tells us certain signals were received
and accepted by institutions of the citizenry.
In considering public benefactions as signals, in which
a material display references hidden capabilities, I suggest
an argument similar to that offered by Neiman for the
so-called Maya collapse: pyramid construction and stelae
erection,82 signals emitted by competing families, ceased
as potential receivers defected to more productive locales.83
For Hellenistic Anatolia and Imperial Asia Minor, civic
benefactions appear when and where they do as conditions
associated with signaling at both individual and communal
levels prevail. The nature of the signal, such as public
buildings versus other kinds of benefactions, also varies
through time as the potential audience expands to include
diverse groups within the city or observers external to the
city. Conditions associated with signaling differ according
to political geography and scalar factors, specifically the
composition and sizes of receiving audiences as well as the
availability of wealth to be devoted towards signaling. Thus,
the trajectory of civic benefactions seen in western Rough
Cilicia should look somewhat different from that observed
farther to the west because of its status as a borderlands,
because of the smaller cities there, and because of the
limited wealth available to support individual signaling. That
communities may have been attempting to relay commitment
to Roman social order in a time of unrest, a version of what
Blanton refers to in his analysis of domestic architecture as
canonical communication,84 may also be important in the
case of western Rough Cilicia.
Cities within regions
At the level of cities within a region, it is useful to distinguish
between a region like western Anatolia and Asia Minor,
interacting with peer cities, and a borderlands situation, like
that seen for western Rough Cilicia and possibly also Lycia,
where interacting communities appear not to have shared a
common parlance.
Peer cities
The textbook treatment of euergetism and civic benefactions
was offered by Veyne and others for the interacting polities of
Hellenistic western Anatolia and later Imperial Asia Minor.85
Here, polities, operating within a shared Greek urban culture,
both cooperated and competed with each other through
challenges of the microimperialism of neighboring cities and
local dynasts, natural disasters such as earthquakes, and the
geopolitical turmoil associated with the expanding Roman

core polity, itself a dynamic entity. And, even with the Pax
Romana, the emperor and other agents of Rome contended
with the recurring squabbles of the Greek cities each vying
for territory and status.86
By the Hellenistic period, Greek cities in this region shared
the institutional apparatus for collective action, such as an
increasingly oligarchic council and assembly. Nevertheless,
history is clear that some cities were more adept than others
in making corporate decisions and executing collective
acts. Cities differentially survived and thrived. Analysis
of the differential success of individual cities considers
the effectiveness of military action,87 as well as diplomatic
embassies, in waging and weathering the “small wars” for
territory.88 In the case of the so-called “big wars,” waged by
vying Successor kings and external core polities for tribute,
it is clear that city or city factions made both good and bad
decisions. Thus, some cities, formerly part of the Attalid
kingdom (for example, Pergamum, Ephesus, and Sardis),
were granted freedom by Rome to acknowledge their support
during the war against the usurper Aristonicus. On the other
hand, many Greek cities were punished for their decision to
support Mithridates IV in his rebellion against Rome with
exorbitant tribute requirements, inheritances stripped, and
fees charged for boarding Roman troops.89
Signaling theory invites us to consider the role of
communal signals – and I especially emphasize public
architecture – in communicating the potential for effective
collective action to local enemies and allies, in the case of
the little wars for territory and, more distantly, to agents of
Rome and other core polities. Fortification walls and forts
served to protect but also may have served as a costly signal
and hence as a deterrent. For example, John Camp reports for
Herakleia under Latmos in Asia Minor that the city circuit
walls appear deliberately monumental.90 More generally, in
the Hellenistic period, prytaneia and bouleuteria became
more massive and were built of expensive exotic materials;
they are often ornately outfitted as previously seen only for
temples.91 And, for the early Imperial period, temples and
sanctuaries for the imperial cult transformed the cities of
Asia Minor.92 With the high Imperial period, massive bath
complexes (fed by aqueducts carrying water across previously
hostile territories now quiet owing to the Pax Romana)
dominated cities.93 But not all cities were equally outfitted
with monumental architecture. Did some cities, such as those
building elaborate fortifications or public buildings, fare
better in attracting new citizens or favors from the emperor?
Signaling theory would anticipate that this is the case, but
the proposition requires evaluation.
Cities in Borderlands
As emphasized above, signaling is effective only if it is
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carried out by senders and receivers that share the same
cultural language. In borderlands, while interaction may
take place, by definition, it occurs across power or culture
frontiers. Borderlands are ambiguous landscapes wherein
“two or more groups come into contact with each other,
where people of different cultural backgrounds occupy the
same territory and where the space between them grows
intimate.”94 While some borderlands are rather simple, with
just a few articulating cultures and with some degree of
temporal stability, Hellenistic and Roman western Rough
Cilicia were borderlands in the extreme. As summarized by
Nicholas Rauh et al., the rugged landscape of western Rough
Cilicia was occupied in antiquity by small (compared with
Greek cities of western Anatolia or Asia Minor) communities
of Luwian-speakers with a subsistence base dominated by
pastoralism or agro-pastoralism and organized in terms of
lineages.95 Texts indicate that western Rough Cilicia was
claimed and possibly partially developed by local chieftains
as well as a series of core polities that included Persia, various
Hellenistic Successors, and finally Rome. The relatively
accessible stands of cedar and other strategic resources
critical to sea-power in the region seem to have attracted
the attention of polities but all were attempting to assert
their claims over relatively large distances, meaning that
their claims were always difficult to sustain for any stretch
of time. This rugged borderland situation also contributed
to western Rough Cilicia becoming a haven for pirates and
brigands, especially during the late Hellenistic period, with
which various core polities grappled in succession.96
The critical point here is that it was not until imperial
Roman times that many or most of the local polities in interior
Anatolia in general and western Rough Cilicia in particular
came to share a semblance of Greco-Roman civic culture.97
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, Roman involvement in
the area was via client kings and queens who, with help from
Roman troops, struggled with local rebellions through the early
Imperial period.98 From the high Imperial period, inscriptions
mention the probouloi (panel of 12 councilors, which ran
the city council), dekaprotoi (local dignitaries who assumed
responsibility for paying taxes and levies), and city officers,
thus obliquely referring to Hellenistic civic institutions.99
In addition, public buildings – agoras, bouleuteria, baths,
and temples as well as enclosures for display of honorific
statues – were constructed at this time, their relative age at
various sites established through association with Roman
period ceramics and affinities with other dated structures.100
Conspicuous in their absence are other structures commonly
seen in contemporaneous Greco-Roman cities to the east
and west: arenas, gymnasia, and theatres.101 Given that the
architecture of western Rough Cilicia is known solely through
what is expressed on the surface, it is possible that such
structures are yet to be found, although, given the large size
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of the missing structures, this seems unlikely. Importantly,
other public structures – monumental tombs situated within
the city proper – bespeak other, presumably indigenous,
influences.102
Regarding the nature of interaction, whether competitive
or cooperative, between and among the small cities of western
Rough Cilicia, some evidence exists. For the Hellenistic
period, occupational remains in the form of ceramics and
burials appear confined to defensible hilltops, and Rauh
reports Hellenistic fortifications throughout the area.103 For
the early Imperial period, Kurt Tomaschitz’s analysis of
inscriptions points to participation in the region-wide network
of agonistic festivals, suggesting inter-city competition
occurred within the constraints of Pax Romana.104
I have already alluded to regional unrest in the early
Imperial period as well as in the third century and beyond.
Under these circumstances, sending communal signals that
relay a strong commitment to Imperial Roman world order, as
well as the emperor and his intermediaries, local client kings
and queens, may have been well rewarded. That is, agoras were
not simply marketplaces for transacting various commercial
activities; their form also communicated participation in
the larger Greco-Roman world (communicating to external
agents) and possibly also served as media in the public
relations war with other local communities. Thus, to the extent
allowed by surface remains, it may be useful to consider
city size and endurance with respect to the outlay of public
structures – their monumentality, the degree to which they
are incorporated into the fabric of the city – present here.
Individuals within cities
The benefactions of wealthy elite individuals must also be
considered in the context of inter-individual interaction,
that is, interactions between citizens within the city. These
interactions may differ because of simple scalar differences
between populous and less populous cities and also because
of the presence and distribution of societal wealth.
Focusing on the latter first, through Hellenistic and
especially imperial times there seems to be a general increase
in personal wealth. For the imperial period, scholars attribute
this increase to the lack of major conflict and the construction
of all-weather roads that linked cities and reduced the cost
of commerce as well as the creation of a coherent legal
system.105 Outside of Rough Cilicia, evidence for the increase
in circulating wealth is found in more meat consumption and
taller stature.106
In addition to an increase in personal wealth, however,
there seems to be a marked increase in wealth differentials,
at least in western Asia Minor, as sketched above. Landed
individuals became relatively more wealthy compared to
others as population increased and land became relatively
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scarcer,107 and possibly also as agriculture became more
productive owing to climatic shifts.108 Zuiderhoek finds
that, excluding gifts of entire buildings, 60% of the public
benefactions attested to by inscription in his database are
small, 1000 denarii or less.109 But, by Zuiderhoek’s reckoning,
1000 denarii represents 80% of the annual income that
would come from rent on land valued at 25,000 denarii, the
minimum wealth requirement for a citizen seeking a position
as a councilor. So, even these small benefactions are being
made by a class of families we might call wealthy, although
perhaps not excessively wealthy.
But were what appear to be costly signals indeed costly?
Zuiderhoek argues that the benefactions offered by the
wealthy were not particularly burdensome, representing
a small fraction – perhaps 5% – of elite wealth.110 His
characterization may be true when the merely wealthy and
the super-wealthy are considered in aggregate. As the costly
signaling literature emphasizes, however, whether a signal is
costly depends on how it impacts an individual’s reproductive
capacity, something very difficult for us to assess. For the
Imperial period, we know individuals attempted to shift
imposed liturgies to others and that civic obligations might
ruin a family and had to be managed very carefully.111 This
pattern suggests that real costs are being incurred by at least
some of the wealthy. And finally sumptuary laws were enacted
during the period 100 BC to AD 50 to rein in the incredible
displays of wealth being made by individuals, thereby
providing cover so aristocrats could avoid bankruptcy.112 In
spite of being excused from liturgies, in the second century
after Christ we see individuals nevertheless making substantial
benefactions, which are duly noted in inscriptions.113 All of
this suggests that public benefactions represent individual or
family signals that were indeed costly.
What did these individual signals convey? Certainly they
conveyed family wealth, some of which could be directed
towards other citizens or solidaristic activities, but other
talents were also exposed. I suggest that individuals with
the education, charisma, and skills to successfully negotiate
complex gifts with council and assembly are being identified
and these same skills are recruited for use by the city on
embassies to or as mediators in other cities,114 or to the local
agent of Rome to lobby for favors.115 Marc Waelkens sees
this role as important for the later Hellenistic period but
downplays it for the Imperial period,116 yet others highlight
the importance of these talents in dealing with agents of
Rome.117 Especially in the times of unrest, such as the first
century BC in western Asia Minor, these talents were valued
and rewarded; in the mid-first century after Christ for southern
Asia Minor, the unrest here might also have created an
environment in which diplomatic talent could shine.
Along with increasing wealth and wealth differentials, the
Hellenistic and Imperial periods are marked by an increased

dynamism to the social landscape as more families with means
vie for a restricted number of seats of power. Council size was
more or less scaled to city size, with smaller cities (for example,
Halicarnassus) having councils of 100 or under and moderate
sized cities like Aphrodisias a council of 200; Ephesus, one
of the larger cities in Asia Minor, seated a council of 450
members.118 Given more contenders for a set number of council
positions, the ostentatious behavior by wealthy elites in the
late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods and the increasing
gate fees incurred to enter into council membership become
understandable. Part and parcel of this may be the propoganda
offered on particular individuals; in her analysis of inscriptions
referring to aedilitian euergetism in Hellenistic Anatolia,
Laure Marest-Caffey notes important changes, from brief
descriptions of euergetai and euergetism in Anatolian cities
for the middle Hellenistic period (prior to the second century
BC) to lengthy descriptions of the education, grooming, career,
and many benefactions of the euergetai in the later Hellenistic
(from the second century to 33 BC).119
By imperial times, council membership had become quite
exclusive, with the council composed of ex-magistrates and
men of hereditary wealth. To enter the council, initiates
must have owned property above a specific threshold and
perhaps have been a member of the ephebia. They sometimes
paid an honorarium to enter the council and were seated
for life. If magistrates were elected (by the citizens), their
candidacy was predetermined by the extant council. By the
high Imperial period, councilors and their families began to
identify themselves as the ruling class and assumed a defining
lifestyle expressed in gymnasial athletics, distinct forms of
literature, and euergetism.120
In effect, Zuiderhoek argues that benefactions had two
different audiences. Potential members of the council are
demonstrating their many virtues to seated members of
the council through acts of beneficence.121 In the parlance
of signaling – and similar to Veblen’s observations on the
nouveau riche of late 19th century America122 – the wealthy
elite are signaling their virtues to the gatekeepers of power,
other wealthy councilors. There is a second audience,
however: the various professional collegia exercised some
power and the assembly also retained some clout.123 Thus,
a signal designed to impress both elites and the demos was
likely the most effective.

5. Signaling in western Asia Minor and
western Rough Cilicia
With these general observations on wealth and the dynamic
social landscape of individuals, let us now consider how
signaling may play out in sizable cities of western Asia Minor
compared with the smaller communities found both in the
west and in western Rough Cilicia.
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Individuals in large cities
Larger cities, such as Pergamon and Ephesus, saw the coresidence of multiple kin groups as well as, by imperial
times, portions of families, as individual family members
pursued opportunities throughout the greater Mediterranean
world.124 Multiple languages – Greek, native, “foreign” and
later Latin – were spoken here, with Greek the language of
civic discourse and with Greek and Latin beginning to replace
local native languages.125
In such a diverse social context, we might expect to see
signaling that has a major material or physical component,
such as monumental public architecture, as individuals
speak to an international, multi-lingual audience. Moreover,
given the costs of building in antiquity, the construction of
monumental structures sends a powerful signal about the
capabilities of the contenders.
Individuals in smaller cities
In smaller cities and communities, individuals, families, and
the capabilities of each might be well known to the other
residents, a domain in which signaling may be of less utility,
per discussion by Neiman. On the other hand, Boone and
Roscoe highlight the role of signaling as families attempt
to assert and maintain their status within a community that
allows for some social mobility.
Where multiple language communities were highlighted
for the larger cities of western Asia Minor, the (male) residents
of interior villages and cities may have been monolingual,
speaking their native language, or bilingual, with some
acquired knowledge of Greek.126 In the smaller cities of Rough
Cilicia, residents likely spoke Luwian and later Greek as well.
Ten Cate’s analysis shows that compound Luwian-Greek
names appear late in the sequence, when urban communities
develop in interior Rough Cilicia under Vespasian. Analysis
by Rauh and colleagues allows differentiation between coastal
and inland cities: for inland sites, almost 100% of the names
appearing in inscriptions are Luwian or Greco-Luwian; in
coastal cities, 75% (Coracesium) to 88% (Iotape) are Luwian
or Greco-Luwian, the remainder being Greek or Latin.127 In
more or less linguistically homogenous communities such
as these, architecture may be a less effective communication
device.
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, we are dealing
with smaller communities with much smaller capacities
overall for wealth. The bouleuterion at Asar Tepe seated an
estimated 55–60 councilors, while at Nephelion, the structure
there interpreted as a small theatre or bouleuterion, likely
accommodated fewer than 100.128 Wealth in antiquity is
scaled primarily to the holding of agricultural land, which in
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western Rough Cilicia may have been quite limited given the
rugged terrain here. On the other hand, this area possessed
tracts of highly valued cedars, presumably still under native
control.129 Depending on the native land use system in place,
the usual calculation of wealth may have to be reconfigured to
account for wealth generated by access to strategic resources,
with those resources possibly managed not by individuals or
individual families, but by tribal lineages.
The presumed native lineage system seems to have been
quite strong here, as evidenced by frequent references to
family members in honorific inscriptions.130 In addition
to population size and degree of wealth then, the number
and sizes of these lineages may be even more critical to
an understanding of signaling. That is, if a community
consists of just a few lineages, again following Neiman’s
arguments, there is little advantage in investing in signals;
no new knowledge is gained. On the other hand, if lineages
are numerous and in an environment made inchoate by dint
of demographic forces, new sources of power and wealth
made available by access to the wider Mediterranean under
the Pax Romana, and instability fostered by resistance to
the Roman world order, then we might expect to see a more
significant expression of signaling by lineages.

6. Signaling in western Rough Cilicia
In the case of western Rough Cilicia, signaling via civic
benefactions and public buildings is expected but the impetus
for – and form of that signal – should vary from that seen
further to the west or east.
At the scale of communities, the degree and kind of
inter-city interaction is difficult to gauge, but what does
seem important is signaling to agents of Rome about the
commitment of a community to support the Roman order,
which seems to have had a somewhat fragile hold with
recurring need for support. Thus, construction of public
buildings, like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths, but especially
temples or other signs of the emperor cult, such as additions to
the honorific enclosed areas, might have conveyed this signal,
both to agents of Rome and would be rebellious factions.
Elsewhere in the greater Mediterranean basin during the
early Imperial period we find the construction of arenas or
the refitting of theatres to support games. To date, no sign of
such populace-oriented structures have been found in western
Rough Cilicia, although Karamut and Russell do describe
one structure at Nephelion as a possible small theatre.131
Rauh and colleagues interpret this pattern as evidence for
the large influence of the council, seating the heads of local
native families, who used, in the parlance suggested here,
modest forms of Roman order architecture to signal their
elite status.132 Two other possibilities follow: the amount of
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circulating wealth may have been insufficient to support such
massive constructions, or, alternatively, the way that wealth
was managed by lineage structures meant that only relatively
smaller public buildings could be constructed.

7. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that civic benefactions, in part responsible for the construction of public
buildings in Asia Minor, are more than simply individual gifts.
Rather, these material manifestations in effect substantially
signal the competence and pro-social orientation of individuals
and lineages. Aggregated by the city, they also signal that
the community itself is competent and able to recruit and
recognize the individual talents of its citizens. The application
of social signaling to the Greco-Roman world, with its
institution of public benefactions and monumental “habit,”
appears very productive. Finally, as a result of examining
social signaling in this context, this exercise also expands
the utility of social signaling as an analytic construct.
In the area of Asia Minor urbanism, the signaling approach
focuses attention on the differential success, i.e., persistence
and spread, of civic structures or the citizens who fashioned
them. More specifically, it posits a relationship between
the splendor of communal signals and the persistence of
communities emitting them, something quite researchable
with the textual, archaeological, and numismatic record for
Asia Minor. It also suggests that public buildings should
be an important signal early on, communicating very
graphically the presence of civic institutions to linguistically
diverse audiences. Such structures may also have helped to
attract citizen recruits133 as well as favors from Rome. Once
the cityscape was constructed, however, other means of
communal signaling were found; the “architecture channel”
was already “saturated.” At this point, an increase in festivals
and competitions should be seen.134
In the case of urbanism in western Rough Cilicia, other
expectations are inspired by signaling thinking. The question
of wealth – amount and distribution – becomes prominent.
How much wealth can be garnered from the agricultural or
mixed agricultural-pastoral-marine subsistence base? (How
ancient are the terraced inner valleys here, which today
support seemingly very productive “Gardens of Eden”?)
Alternatively, was wealth available to these communities
from the harvest of stands of cedar? Should the occurrence
of small-scale bouleuteria, baths, and somewhat grand (for
example, Lamus) agoras here, but no arenas or theatres, be
read as an index of the relative wealth of the area? How did
western Rough Cilicia communities with different kinds or
numbers of public buildings fare with respect to support from
Rome during times of unrest? Did such structures attract

unwelcome attention from fractious native elements in the
Isaurian hinterland?
In the area of signaling, I have offered several elaborations,
including the role of peer interaction. That is, signaling does
not exist in a vacuum but occurs between more or less
homologous entities that speak the same cultural language.
Having said this, it is worth noting that communal signaling
to receivers beyond peers, in this case by newly recognized
western Rough Cilicia communities to agents of Rome,
may be quite important, especially in times of unrest and
rebellion.
Finally, much of the literature on signaling expressly
focuses on individuals, families, and larger kin structures.135
Here, the focus is on cities with particular republican (that is,
supra-kin forms of law-based government) civic structures,
which supplant or augment kin structures. Cities competing
with other cities for citizens and for favors from Rome
engaged in a kind of signaling appropriate to their context,
with public buildings sometimes donated by wealthy elites
and sometimes constructed by “the city.” Other signals,
games and festivals, also served as the media of inter-city
competition.
In sum, the signaling approach opens a broad avenue for
research on the nature and form of urbanism in Anatolia and
Asia Minor. The rich textual, archaeological, and numismatic
record from this landscape, along with the natural challenges
posed by in-silting harbors and earthquakes, allow for
an extraordinary laboratory within which to explore the
relationship between social signal form and consequence,
especially at the communal level.
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